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Abstract 
There has been a resurgence in debate over the desirability and feasibility of a 
treaty between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders and the Australian State. The 
discussion has proceeded on the assumption that no such treaties exist. But is this 
correct? In this article, we examine the concepts and ideas underlying a treaty, 
with a view to determining a standard against which agreements and negotiated 
settlements can be assessed. The standard we apply is informed by the modern 
treaty-making process in Canada to locate it in contemporary practices and values. 
We then examine whether any agreement reached in Australia can be regarded as 
a treaty, including settlements reached under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) and 
more recent agreements made outside that regime. We conclude that the South 
West Native Title Settlement, a negotiated agreement between the Noongar people 
and the Western Australian Government, is Australia’s first treaty. 
I Introduction 
Treaties are accepted around the world as the means of resolving differences 
between Indigenous peoples and those who have colonised their lands. They have 
been reached in the United States (‘US’),1 and Aotearoa/New Zealand,2 and are still 
being negotiated in Canada today.3 In contrast, no treaty between Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples and the Australian State has ever been recognised. 
This is despite Australia having experienced decades of debate about whether a 
treaty should be negotiated with Indigenous peoples.4 
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1 See, eg, Two Row Wampum Treaty (signed and entered into force 21 April 1613), negotiated between 
representatives of the Haudenosaunee and Dutch Government in modern upstate New York; Treaty 
of 1677 (signed and entered into force 29 May 1677), negotiated between Charles II of England and 
representatives of the Nottoway, Appomattoc, Wayonaoake, Nansemond, Nanzatico, Monacan, 
Saponi and Meherrin peoples; Treaty with the Delawares (signed and entered into force 17 September 
1778) negotiated between the Delaware people and the US government.  
2 Treaty of Waitangi, signed 6 February 1840, (entered into force 21 May 1840), negotiated between 
the British Crown and Māori chiefs.  
3 See, eg, Mi’kmaq Peace and Friendship Treaty, signed 15 December 1725, (entered into force 4 June 
1726). For modern day treaties, see below Part IIB. 
4 See, eg, Yolngu People, Yirrkala Bark Petition (August 1963); Stewart Harris, It’s Coming Yet: An 
Aboriginal Treaty within Australia between Australians (Aboriginal Rights Treaty Committee, 
1979); National Aboriginal Conference, ‘The Makarrata: Some Ways Forward’ (Position Paper 
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The treaty movement in Australia has been reinvigorated, and is being 
propelled forward by several events. In February 2016, the Victorian Government 
announced its commitment to negotiate a treaty with Aboriginal Victorians.5 
Consultative forums have since been held in Melbourne and across regional Victoria 
to develop a culturally appropriate representative body through which those 
negotiations can take place.6 An Aboriginal Treaty Working Group and a Victorian 
Treaty Advancement Commissioner will provide advice to community and 
government, and guide the establishment of the representative body.7 In September 
2016, incoming Northern Territory Chief Minister Michael Gunner declared that his 
Government would establish a subcommittee on Aboriginal affairs to ‘drive public 
discussions on a treaty’ between the Territory and Indigenous nations.8 Although no 
firm commitment has yet been made, treaty remains on the Government’s agenda.9 
In South Australia, events are moving forward more quickly. In December 2016, 
discussion began between the South Australian Government and three Indigenous 
nations aimed at finalising a treaty.10 Following the report of the South Australian 
Treaty Commissioner in July 2017,11 the State commenced negotiations with three 
Aboriginal nations: the Ngarrindjeri, Narungga and Adnyamathanha.12 
The treaty debate has also assumed prominence as people ask whether the 
proposed recognition of Indigenous peoples in the Australian Constitution13 should 
be accompanied by a final, negotiated settlement. At the First Nations Constitutional 
Convention at Uluru in May 2017, around 250 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
delegates called on the Commonwealth to establish a Makarrata Commission. 
																																																								
presented at World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Canberra, April 1981); Senate Standing 
Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Two Hundred Years Later… 
Report by the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs on the Feasibility of a 
Compact or ‘Makarrata’ between the Commonwealth and Aboriginal People (1983) xii 
recommendation 1; Bob Hawke, ‘Statement of the Prime Minister: Barunga Festival’ (1988) 2(6) 
Land Rights News 22; Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, ‘Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge’ 
(Report, Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 4 December 2000) 106 recommendation 6. 
5 Hamish Fitzsimmons, ‘Victorian Government to Begin Talks with First Nations on Australia’s First 
Indigenous Treaty’, ABC News (online), 26 February 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-
26/victoria-to-begin-talks-for-first-indigenous-treaty/7202492>. 
6 See Aboriginal Treaty Interim Working Group, Aboriginal Community Consultations on the Design 
of a Representative Body (December 2016); Aboriginal Treaty Interim Working Group, Aboriginal 
Community Consultations on the Design of a Representative Body — Phase 2 (June 2017). 
7 Aboriginal Victoria, Victorian Treaty Advancement Commission <https://www.vic.gov.au/aboriginal 
victoria/treaty/victorian-treaty-advancement-commission.html>. 
8 Helen Davidson, ‘Northern Territory Labor Government Announces Majority Female Cabinet’, The 
Guardian (online), 12 September 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/sep/12/ 
northern-territory-labor-government-announces-majority-female-cabinet>. 
9 NT News, ‘Indigenous Treaty Remains on NT Government’s Agenda’, NT News (online),  
4 May 2017 <http://www.ntnews.com.au/news/northern-territory/indigenous-treaty-remains-on-nt-
governments-agenda/news-story/299369abf4b496a06aa92ee8e5d0300d>. 
10 Caroline Winter, ‘Treaty: South Australian Government Enters Historic Discussions with Aboriginal 
Nations’, ABC News (online), 15 December 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-14/south-
australia-enters-historic-treaty-discussions/8120162>.  
11 Dr Roger Thomas (Treaty Commissioner), Talking Treaty: Summary of Engagements and Next Steps 
(Office of the Treaty Commissioner, Government of South Australia, July 2017). 
12 Department of State Development (SA), Treaty Discussions <https://statedevelopment.sa.gov.au/ 
aboriginal-affairs/aboriginal-affairs-and-reconciliation/initiatives/treaty-discussions>. 
13 See generally Megan Davis and George Williams, Everything You Need to Know about the 
Referendum to Recognise Indigenous Australians (NewSouth Publishing, 2015). 
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Makarrata is a Yolngu word meaning ‘a coming together after a struggle’, and the 
delegates explained that it ‘captures our aspirations for a fair and truthful relationship 
with the people of Australia’.14 The Commission would ‘supervise a process of 
agreement-making between governments and First Nations’.15 
Despite the emergent treaty negotiations in Victoria, the Northern Territory 
and South Australia, and the Uluru Convention’s call for a Makarrata Commission, 
treaty-talk at the national level is plagued by two questionable assumptions. These 
are that no treaties exist between Indigenous peoples and the Australian State, and 
that a treaty would amount to a radical, perhaps impossible, shift in Australia’s 
public law system. In this article, we address the first of these assumptions, that is, 
whether it is correct to say that no treaty has been signed between Indigenous peoples 
and the State. This is a key question in the contemporary debate. If Australia has 
already entered into one or more treaties, this could provide the basis for further like 
outcomes, and also end questions about the capacity of Australia’s legal system to 
accommodate such agreements. 
In Part II, we examine the concept of treaties between Indigenous peoples 
and the State to determine what is meant by the term, and the type of agreements it 
covers. Our approach is substantive, rather than formalistic: we look at the concepts 
and ideas underlying a treaty, asking what principles and values a comprehensive 
negotiated settlement should express. This uncovers the fact that there is no one form 
of ‘treaty’, but a diverse variety of agreements establishing and governing a myriad 
of interrelationships.16 We then examine examples of such agreements so that our 
standard is further developed by way of case studies. As liberal democracies with a 
similar colonial history and common law systems, Canada, Aotearoa/New Zealand 
and the US are all natural comparators to Australia. Of these, we look at Canada in 
particular because treaties are still being negotiated there between the State and First 
Nations. Consequently, it offers the best opportunity to locate our understanding of 
a treaty in current practices and public law values, rather than only in historical 
examples. While there are many modern treaty processes occurring in Canada, 
including the Yukon and Inuit Land Claims,17 our focus is on British Columbia. It is 
the best comparator from Canada given that it involves agreements over land in 
which a significant number of peoples live (4.631 million in British Columbia, 
compared to 35 874 in Yukon and 35 944 in Nunavut). 
In Part III, we examine whether any agreement reached in Australia can be 
regarded as a treaty. We explore the negotiated settlements reached under the Native 
																																																								




16 Marcia Langton, Maureen Tehan and Lisa Palmer, ‘Introduction’ in Marcia Langton et al (eds), 
Honour Among Nations?: Treaties and Agreements with Indigenous Peoples (Melbourne University 
Press, 2004) 1, 2. 
17 The Yukon Land Claims are conducted under the Umbrella Final Agreement (signed and entered 
into force March 1990); for the Inuit see, eg Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (signed 25 May 1993; 
entered into force 9 July 1993). ‘Modern’ treaties are those negotiated after the 1973 Canadian 
Supreme Court decision Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] SCR 313 (‘Calder’). 
See below at Part IIB(1). 
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Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘NTA’), and more recent agreements made outside the native 
title regime. Of these, a primary focus is the South West Native Title Settlement, a 
negotiated agreement between the Noongar people and the Western Australian 
Government.18 Under this settlement, the Noongar people have agreed to exchange 
native title rights for a comprehensive package of benefits including recognition of 
traditional ownership, land, a significant financial future fund and other 
commitments.19 
II Treaties with Indigenous Peoples 
A What is a Treaty? 
Political communities have long negotiated agreements with neighbours to secure 
peace and protect and promote their interests. One of the earliest such treaties was 
settled between the rival Mesopotamian kingdoms of Lagash and Umma between 
2550 and 2600 BCE. Expressed in the Sumerian language and inscribed on a stone 
monument, the Agreement established a territorial boundary between the parties, 
provided for a system of arbitration if a dispute arose over its interpretation, and 
designated the ruler of a third State to act as an arbitrator.20 Evidence also exists that, 
from the 8th century BCE, extensive treaty relations were conducted within ancient 
China between different nations.21 Similarly, pre-contact, Indigenous nations 
developed processes for making and maintaining peaceful diplomatic relations with 
others.22 Agreements were also negotiated between warring political communities 
across Europe.23 It is no surprise then, that when European colonial powers met 
Indigenous political communities, negotiated agreements were often struck. 
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is ‘an 
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law’.24 This definition might be taken to exclude agreements struck 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples,25 and indeed, many scholarly 
works on the international law of treaties do not encompass discussion of these 
																																																								
18 Land, Approvals and Native Title Unit (WA), South West Native Title Settlement, Government of Western 
Australia <https://www.dpc.wa.gov.au/lantu/south-west-native-title-settlement/Pages/default.aspx>. 
19 See below Part IIIB(1). 
20 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Relevance of Theory and History — The Essence and Origins of 
International Law’ in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on the Theory and History 
of International Law (Edward Elgar, 2011) 3, 20; Gbenga Oduntan, International Law and Boundary 
Disputes in Africa (Routledge, 2015) 69.  
21 Richard Walker estimates that over 140 treaties were negotiated between 722–476 BCE: Richard 
Louis Walker, The Multi-State System of Ancient China (Shoe String Press, 1953) 82. 
22 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
(1996) vol 1, 112–14 [3.1]; Leanne Simpson, ‘Looking After Gdoo-naaganinaa: Precolonial 
Nishnaabeg Diplomatic and Treaty Relationships’ (2008) 23(2) Wicazo Sa Review 29.  
23 See, eg, Treaty of Durham (signed and entered into force 9 April 1136); Treaty of Westphalia (signed 
and entered into force 24 October 1648); Treaty of the Pyrenees (signed and entered into force 
7 November 1659). 
24 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980) art 2(1)(a) (‘Vienna Convention’). 
25 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2013) 16. 
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agreements.26 But this approach is unduly limited for two reasons. First, as the 
Special Rapporteur on the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities noted in his 1997 report on treaties with Indigenous peoples, 
in establishing formal legal relationships with peoples overseas, the European 
parties were clearly aware that they were negotiating and entering into 
contractual relations with sovereign nations, with all the international legal 
implications of that term during the period under consideration.27 
By entering into formal agreements with the Indigenous peoples they met, the 
European powers acknowledged the legal capacity of those peoples to make such 
treaties. Even if Indigenous peoples today do not constitute states, the concept of 
‘sovereignty’ is fluid, and Australian public law principles can comprehend the 
notion of shared jurisdiction between polities.28 Second, the definition adopted under 
the Vienna Convention is expressly limited ‘for the purposes of the present 
Convention’,29 and is not determinative of our understanding of political agreements 
more broadly, nor for defining negotiated settlements between Indigenous peoples 
and the State. 
A holistic approach to understanding treaties avoids marginalising the 
agreements struck between Indigenous and non-Indigenous political communities. 
It sees treaties broadly as, for example, ‘formalised records of negotiated agreements 
between parties, usually states, but sometimes people’,30 ‘political agreements 
involving Indigenous peoples and governments that have a binding legal effect’31 
and ‘formal and consensual bilateral juridical instruments’.32 These definitions can 
encompass a wide variety of forms, processes and outcomes, reflecting the diverse 
experiences and perspectives of parties to such agreements across time and space. 
Our starting point for establishing a standard by which agreements can be 
assessed as being treaties is a three-year study by Brennan and colleagues of treaties 
between Indigenous peoples and the State. This study, the only one of its type so far 
undertaken in Australia, concluded that such treaties contain three criteria.33 First, 
they are based on an acknowledgment by the State that Indigenous peoples were 
prior owners and occupiers of the land now claimed by the State. This entails 
recognising that, in the absence of a treaty, the legitimacy of state authority over 
																																																								
26 No discussion of treaties between Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous peoples appears in: Enzo 
Cannizzaro and Mahnoush H Arsanjani (eds), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention 
(Oxford University Press, 2011); Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Olufemi Elias, Contemporary Issues in 
the Law of Treaties (Eleven Publishing, 2005); Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International 
Law (Kluwer Law, 1998). Cf Ian Brownlie, Treaties with Indigenous Peoples: The Robb Lectures 
(Clarendon Press, 1992).  
27 Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapporteur, Studies on Treaties, Agreements and Other 
Constructive Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 
1999/20 (22 June 1999) 18 [110]. 
28 Sean Brennan, Brenda Gunn and George Williams, ‘“Sovereignty” and Its Relevance to Treaty-
Making between Indigenous Peoples and Australian Governments’ (2004) 26(3) Sydney Law Review 
307, 347–9. 
29 Vienna Convention art 2(1). 
30 J R Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, 2009) 3. 
31 Sean Brennan et al, Treaty (Federation Press, 2005) 3.  
32 Martinez, above n 27, 14 [82]. See further Brennan, Gunn and Williams, above n 28, 309–10. 
33 Brennan et al, above n 31, 3–11. 
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Indigenous peoples is contested. As part of this first component, the State typically 
acknowledges the deep injustices done to Indigenous peoples as part of the colonial- 
and state-building projects, and that this injustice continues to manifest today. 
Second, the treaties are concluded by way of negotiation, with ‘governments and 
Indigenous peoples sitting round the table’ and coming to an agreement.34 Third, 
while the negotiation process holds many benefits, the treaties must include 
substantive outcomes. These outcomes should recognise legal rights to protect 
Indigenous peoples from ‘the wavering sympathies of the [broader political] 
community’,35 as well as provide opportunities for sustainable economic 
development. 
These criteria are a useful starting point. However, the study concluded in 
2005, and there have been significant events since that time. For example, the United 
Nations General Assembly’s adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (‘UNDRIP’) in 2007,36 endorsed by Australia in 2009, signals significant 
developments in Indigenous rights and global democratic governance standards. 
Although not legally binding, the UNDRIP envisages and endorses a pluralised 
account of the State, where sovereignties are dispersed among multiple polities.37 For 
instance, art 3 recognises and affirms that ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to self-
determination’, which entails the right to ‘freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’. In exercising this 
right, art 4 further guarantees that Indigenous peoples have ‘the right to autonomy or 
self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs’. 
The Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, has noted that the 
norms of the Declaration ‘substantially reflect Indigenous peoples own aspirations, 
which after years of deliberation have come to be accepted by the international 
community’.38 For this reason, Indigenous leaders recognised Australia’s endorsement 
of the Declaration as marking a ‘watershed moment’ in Australia’s relationship with 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and as ‘another piece in the jigsaw puzzle 
of reconciliation’.39 The terms of, and principles underlying, the Declaration thus serve 
as an important component of any modern treaty. Indeed, the Declaration creates a 
framework for Indigenous dialogue and political advocacy with states.40 It is through 
treaties that this dialogue may be conducted. 
																																																								
34 Sean Brennan, ‘Why a “Treaty” and Why This Project?’ (Discussion Paper No 1, Gilbert and Tobin 
Centre of Public Law, January 2003) 5.  
35 Larissa Behrendt, Achieving Social Justice: Indigenous Rights and Australia’s Future (Federation 
Press, 2003) 8. 
36 GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st sess, 107th plen mtg, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 
(13 September 2007). 
37 Will Kymlicka, ‘Beyond the Indigenous/Minority Dichotomy?’ in Stephen Allen and Alexandra 
Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart, 2011) 
183, 190. 
38 James Anaya, Special Rapporteur, Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, UN Doc A/65/264 (9 August 2010) 17 [60].  
39 Tom Calma and Mick Dodson respectively, quoted in Sheila Collingwood-Whittick, ‘Australia’s 
Northern Territory Intervention and Indigenous Rights on Language, Education and Culture: An 
Ethnocidal Solution to Aboriginal “Dysfunction”?’ in Elvira Pulitano (ed), Indigenous Rights in the 
Age of the UN Declaration (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 110, 115. 
40 Megan Davis, ‘The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2007) 6(30) 
Indigenous Law Bulletin 6, 6.  
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Other significant developments continue to occur in Canada. That nation has, 
for many years, engaged in crafting treaties between Indigenous peoples and the 
State, which are recognised as being ‘solemn agreements that set out promises, 
obligations and benefits for both parties’.41 Canada’s experience is of central 
importance to this article. Our aim in understanding what is meant by a treaty is not 
to locate the term in historical understandings of the concept that reflect outdated 
societal and public law values, including as to the limited place of Indigenous 
peoples within the State. Indeed, what might have been regarded as a treaty in the 
past may be no more than a tokenistic or sham agreement that falls short of what is 
now regarded as satisfactory.42 In contrast, the concept today should be consistent 
with contemporary legal values such as non-discrimination, self-determination and 
equality,43 as reflected in instruments such as the UNDRIP. 
In the sections below, we refine and develop the criteria of acknowledgement, 
negotiation, and substantive outcomes, in light of these concerns and more recent 
developments. We then ground this analysis in the experience of the modern 
treaty-making process in Canada. The resulting three criteria reveal a substantive 
rather than formalistic standard that is suitable for use in Australia to determine 
whether recent agreements amount to a treaty between Indigenous peoples and the 
State. 
1 Recognition as Polities 
The first criteria recognises that a treaty acknowledges that Indigenous peoples were 
prior owners and occupiers of the land now claimed by the State. Acknowledgement 
only of this, though, is insufficient. A treaty must also recognise that Indigenous 
peoples are ‘polities’.44 A polity is a distinct political community composed of 
individuals collectively united by identity. It can take many forms, including a 
nation-state, empire, or a sub-state unit. Indigenous communities in Australia have 
a long history operating as a distinct society, with a unique economic, religious and 
spiritual relationship to their land.45 Despite this, governments have preferred to 
conceive Indigenous peoples as cultural or ethnic minorities within a larger 
undifferentiated political community. As Barker has explained, the ‘making ethnic’ 
or ‘ethnicisation’ of Indigenous peoples is a political strategy that relegates 
Indigenous peoples’ aspirations and demands to that of just another minority interest, 
																																																								
41 Department of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, Treaties with Aboriginal People in Canada 
(15 September 2010) Government of Canada <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100032291/ 
1100100032292>. 
42 David A Wishart, ‘Contract, Oppression and Agreements with Indigenous Peoples’ (2005) 28(3) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 780, 820. 
43 Though as Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 illustrates, reconciling Indigenous rights with 
rights to non-discrimination and equality can be conceptually difficult. 
44 Marcia Langton and Lisa Palmer, ‘Treaties, Agreement Making and the Recognition of Indigenous 
Customary Polities’ in Marcia Langton et al (eds), Honour Among Nations?: Treaties and 
Agreements with Indigenous Peoples (Melbourne University Press, 2004) 34, 34–49. 
45 Erica-Irene A Daes, ‘An Overview of the History of Indigenous Peoples: Self-determination and the 
United Nations’ (2008) 21(1) Cambridge Review of International Affairs 7, 13. 
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erasing their status as a polity and robbing their calls of political force.46 An 
important function of a treaty is to redress this by way of appropriate 
acknowledgement. 
Recognising Indigenous peoples as a polity is, therefore, a first step in any 
treaty relationship. Failure to do so would ‘undermine the purpose and intent’ of any 
treaty,47 as it is through such acknowledgement that the State commits to reconcile 
‘the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown’.48 Such 
acknowledgement differentiates Indigenous peoples from other citizens, and 
distinguishes the agreement from other legal forms such as contracts. It also reflects 
international law as affirmed in the UNDRIP. The Declaration recognises that 
Indigenous peoples have multiple nested or overlapping nationalities,49 guaranteeing 
that Indigenous peoples have the right ‘to a nationality’,50 as well as the right to 
‘belong to an Indigenous community or nation’ determined in accordance with the 
‘traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned’.51 Indeed, art 33 
expressly guarantees that membership in an Indigenous nation ‘does not impair the 
right of Indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live’. 
2 Reached by Negotiation 
A treaty is a political agreement to be reached by way of negotiation. Negotiation is 
the appropriate process for resolving differences between Indigenous peoples and 
the State as it: reduces the risk that the rights and interests of significant groups will 
be ignored; brings relevant information and perspectives to the decision-making 
process; and recognises that winner-take-all processes are unlikely to endure or to 
produce good policy.52 Additionally, as negotiation eschews overly legalistic 
frameworks, it offers parties a ‘more flexible forum for working out acceptable 
arrangements’,53 building relationships based on trust and communication. At a 
minimum, negotiations must be respectful of each participant’s ‘equality of 
standing’,54 reflecting the acknowledgment that Indigenous peoples are polities.55  
																																																								
46 Joanne Barker, ‘For Whom Sovereignty Matters’ in Joanne Barker (ed), Sovereignty Matters: 
Locations of Contestations and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination 
(University of Nebraska Press, 2005) 1, 16 (emphasis altered). 
47 Michael Mansell, Treaty and Statehood: Aboriginal Self-determination (Federation Press, 2016) 113. 
48 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 1124 [186] (Lamer CJ, Cory and Major JJ) 
(citations omitted) (‘Delgamuukw’). See also Director, Agriculture Branch, Department of Energy, 
Mines and Resources v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation [2010] 3 SCR 103, 153 [103] (LeBel 
and Deschamps JJ). 
49 Keating calls this ‘plurinationalism’: Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations 
in a Post-Sovereignty Era (Oxford University Press, 2001) 27. On the possibility of treaties 
constituting a new form of substantively inclusive citizenship, see Harry Hobbs, ‘Constitutional 
Recognition and Reform: Developing an Inclusive Australian Citizenship through Treaty’ (2018) 53 
Australian Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).  
50 UNDRIP art 6. 
51 Ibid art 9.  
52 Brennan et al, above n 31, 8. 
53 Christopher McKee, Treaty Talks in British Columbia: Building a New Relationship (UBC Press,  
3rd ed, 2009) 109. 
54 Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, 2014) 102. 
55 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 29, 211. 
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Securing a fair negotiation process is difficult, but approaches in Canada and 
Aotearoa/New Zealand suggest adapting fiduciary principles may be appropriate.56 
In both countries, courts have developed constitutional principles that structure the 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown to avoid ‘sharp dealing[s]’57 
and prevent the settler-State from acting in their self-interest in negotiations. In 
dealing with Indigenous peoples, both states have ‘trust-like’58 responsibilities that 
are ‘analogous to fiduciary duties’.59 In Canada, these principles derive ‘from the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de facto control of 
land and resources that were formerly in the control of that people’.60 While ‘[w]hat 
constitutes honourable conduct will vary with the circumstances’,61 the Aotearoa/ 
New Zealand courts insist negotiation should be conducted under principles of ‘good 
faith, reasonableness, trust, openness and consultation’,62 and ‘with the utmost good 
faith which is the characteristic obligation of partnership’.63 These principles are 
affirmed by the Waitangi Tribunal. In its Te Whänau o Waipareira Report, the 
Tribunal explained that negotiation should be ‘conducted in a spirit of partnership 
with the mutual goal of enhancing the status of the other party and the quality of the 
relationship’.64 These qualities are necessary for any fair negotiation. 
The UNDRIP further elucidates the appropriate standard for any negotiation. 
The Declaration provides that states must undertake ‘effective consultation’65 or 
‘[consult] and cooperat[e]’66 with Indigenous peoples before adopting and 
implementing measures that may affect them. Such consultation should be 
‘undertaken in good faith’ with representatives freely chosen by Indigenous peoples 
through their own representative structures. It implies ‘no coercion, intimidation or 
manipulation’, and requires sufficient time and information.67 This standard 
recognises Indigenous peoples’ ‘inherent and prior rights to their lands … and 
respects their legitimate authority’.68 
																																																								
56 Kirsty Gover, ‘The Honour of the Crowns: State-Indigenous Fiduciary Relationships and Australian 
Exceptionalism’ (2016) 38(3) Sydney Law Review 339. 
57 R v Badger [1996] 1 SCR 771, 794 [41] (La Forest, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory and Iacobucci JJ). 
58 Guerin v The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 335, 386 (Dickson, Beetz, Chouinard and Lamer JJ). 
59 New Zealand Maori Council v A-G (NZ) [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 664 (Cooke P) (Court of Appeal) (‘New 
Zealand Maori Council (1987)’). 
60 Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v A-G (Canada) [2013] 1 SCR 623, 658 [66] (McLachlin CJ and 
Karakatsanis J) (citations omitted). 
61 Ibid 663 [74] (McLachlin CJ and Karakatsanis J). 
62 New Zealand Maori Council v A-G (NZ) [2008] 1 NZLR 318, 337 [81] (O’Regan J) (Court of Appeal) 
(‘New Zealand Maori Council (2008)’).  
63 New Zealand Maori Council (1987) [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 664 (Cooke P). 
64 Waitangi Tribunal, Te Whänau o Waipareira Report (1998) 234. 
65 UNDRIP art 30(2). 
66 Ibid arts 15(2), 17(2), 19, 32(2), 36(2), 38. 
67 Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies 
regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, 4th sess, Agenda Item 4,  
UN Doc E/C.19/2005/3 (17–19 January 2005) 12 [46]. See also: at 12 [47].  
68 UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
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While it is desirable that negotiations be structured to minimise the risk that 
significant disparities in power, resources, and capacity affect the process and terms 
of the agreement, such imbalances will not necessarily mean that the political 
agreement is not a treaty. Negotiations will not occur on a level playing field. All 
agreements, for example, will be reached based on an assumption of overriding 
sovereignty of the State. Nonetheless, it is critical to our definition that Indigenous 
peoples are parties to a fair negotiation, not merely an interest group entitled to be 
consulted or informed of its progress. The process of reaching such an agreement is 
itself evidence of a commitment to redefining and securing a just, ‘positive, mutually 
respectful and long-term’69 relationship between Indigenous peoples and the State. 
3 Settlement of Claims 
Both sides must accept a series of responsibilities so that the agreement can bind the 
parties in a relationship of mutual obligation.70 This goes beyond each party 
tolerating the other’s existence to accepting their enduring presence, accepting that, 
in the words of Lamer CJ of the Supreme Court of Canada, ‘we are all here to stay’.71 
Two issues arise: what sort of outcomes will be agreed, and whether the agreement 
constitutes a full and final settlement of Indigenous and state claims. 
Considering the diversity of Indigenous communities across the globe, it is 
impossible to be prescriptive in terms of outcomes. While the content of negotiated 
agreements differs, however, to constitute a treaty, an agreement must contain more 
than mere symbolic recognition; an inherent right to some level of sovereignty or 
self-government must be recognised and provided for. This may be seen as a 
concomitant of the recognition of an Indigenous community as a polity, as required 
under our first criteria. 
In Canada, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has identified ‘a golden 
thread’ running through the treaty relationship, whereby the common law recognises 
the ‘ancestral laws and customs [of] the aboriginal peoples who occupied the land 
prior to European settlement’.72 However, as Macklem notes, despite often referring 
to Indigenous ‘legal systems’73 or noting that First Nations constituted ‘organized, 
distinctive societies with their own social and political structures’,74 the Court ‘has 
been circumspect about … recognizing and affirming an Aboriginal right of 
self-government, that is, an Aboriginal right to make laws’ under s 35(1) of the 
Canadian Constitution.75 
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In Delgamuukw, a majority of the Court held that Aboriginal title confers a 
collective right to exclusive use and occupation of land for a variety of purposes not 
necessarily related to practices, customs and traditions integral to the distinctive 
Aboriginal culture.76 As a collective right, Aboriginal title necessarily has a 
‘jurisdictional dimension’ because as Slattery explains, ‘there must be some body or 
bodies endowed with the authority to determine which individuals have the right to 
use the land and to regulate the ways the land may be used’.77 However, the majority 
cautioned that this right is subject to an ‘inherent limit’: land cannot be used in a 
manner that ‘is irreconcilable with the nature of the claimants’ attachment to those 
lands’.78 In Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, the Court affirmed this 
understanding, holding that the Aboriginal right ‘to use and control the land and 
enjoy its benefits’79 is a ‘right to proactively use and manage the land’.80 Yet, again, 
the Court confirmed that this right is subject to inherent limitations: as a collective 
title held not just for the present generation ‘but for all succeeding generations’, land 
cannot be ‘developed or misused in a way that would substantially deprive future 
generations of the benefit of the land’.81 Whatever the scope of this limitation, it is 
not one that burdens other forms of collective title, such as Crown land, and therefore 
substantially detracts from First Nations’ right to self-government. 
Likewise, in the US, while the Supreme Court recognised the inherent 
sovereignty of Native American tribes in 1823,82 this sovereignty is limited83 and 
defeasible by congressional action.84 Further, the scope of self-governance rights 
over non-Indians is constrained. Tribal nations possess inherent power over their 
internal affairs, including the authority to regulate the activities of non-Indians who 
enter ‘consensual relationships’ with the tribe or its members within tribal lands,85 
but it is not clear whether this extends to the power to try civil cases in Indian tribal 
courts.86 Similarly, while tribal nations may exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians (including non-member Indians)87 within their territory, they have no 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian persons who commit crimes,88 but, rather, may 
only ‘exclude persons whom they deem to be undesirable from tribal lands’.89 
In Aotearoa/New Zealand, debate persists over whether the Treaty of 
Waitangi protects Māori sovereignty and the extent of those protections. The dispute 
arises from an inconsistency between the English and Māori texts. Under the English 
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text, the Māori signatories appear to cede their sovereignty to the British Crown. 
However, under the Māori text, the signatories agreed to cede kawanatanga 
(governorship), while being promised that their tino rangatiratanga (full authority) 
over their land, people and treasure would remain undisturbed. Like all expressions 
of sovereignty, defining tino rangatiratanga is ‘elusive and very much dependent on 
its context’.90 Maaka and Fleras note that, for some, tino rangatiratanga means Māori 
sovereignty ‘prevails over the entirety of Aotearoa; for others, it entails some degree 
of autonomy from the state; for still others, it consists of shared jurisdictions within 
a single framework’.91 The Waitangi Tribunal understands tino rangatiratanga as 
protecting autonomy, meaning ‘the ability of tribal communities to govern 
themselves as they had for centuries, to determine their own internal political, 
economic, and social rights and objectives, and to act collectively in accordance with 
those determinants’.92 
Common across each of these nations is that a treaty incorporates some form 
of recognition of Indigenous self-government. The extent of this recognition is 
variable, and need not extend to granting formal law-making and law-applying 
powers. Rather, it must recognise or establish structures of culturally appropriate 
governance and means of decision-making and control that amount to at least a 
limited form of self-government.93 As we illustrate in the following section on the 
Canadian experience, this can include governing systems that reflect the Indigenous 
nation’s own ‘collective sense of self, values, and priorities’, and that extend beyond 
merely management or administration of programs and services designed and funded 
by settler-State governments.94 These outcomes are consistent with the UNDRIP, 
which provides that Indigenous peoples have the ‘right to autonomy or self-
government’ in relation to ‘internal and local affairs’,95 including the ability to wield 
greater control over land and resources, as well as authority to ensure cultural 
preservation and integrity.96 
Recognising a right to self-government is important as it indicates that the 
purpose of a treaty is more than an act of symbolic recognition. It is recognition of 
a relationship between Indigenous peoples and the State designed to improve the 
lives of Indigenous communities, and to secure the foundations for a just 
relationship. As such, a treaty is more than a contractual agreement. It is ‘an 
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exchange of solemn promises … [and] an agreement whose nature is sacred’.97 This 
aspect of a treaty is significant in light of empirical evidence from the Harvard 
Project on American Indian Economic Development that demonstrates that 
Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination is a necessary condition for 
successful political and economic development.98 However, while self-government 
rights are recognised in all treaties, the extent or scope of this right (save some 
minimum standard) will be subject to negotiation. This permits differing tiers of 
self-governance according to the size and aspirations of the Indigenous nation, as is 
appropriate in countries like Australia where Indigenous communities are ‘diverse 
in culture and circumstance’ and consequently have very different needs and 
aspirations.99 
In agreeing to a series of mutual obligations and responsibilities, Indigenous 
polities and the State must accept that the agreement constitutes a settlement, or 
resolution, of their claims. The extent of any such resolution is contested. In 
exchange for a package of benefits, Indigenous peoples are expected to consent to 
withdrawing all current and future claims relating to historical and contemporary 
dispossession; though of course, claims arising from dispute over aspects of the 
negotiated agreement can be heard. This satisfies the State’s desire for certainty, 
which Woolford suggests is ‘an antidote to an assemblage of questions, risks, and 
fears held by non-Aboriginal government and business interests’.100 Of most 
significance are questions relating to foundational myths about ownership and 
jurisdiction, and economic concerns surrounding current and future investment. In 
the past, certainty was achieved by unilaterally extinguishing Indigenous rights; 
now, they must be negotiated away.  
Indigenous peoples may understand the process in a different light. Wary of 
state demands to surrender their rights and interests, many see them as ‘living 
instrument[s]’101 that do not settle the relationship, but ‘redefine the rules for future 
engagement’.102 As political agreements, they can always be reinterpreted and 
renegotiated, but resolving current and future claims is an integral plank in the new 
political relationship built by any treaty. That said, while a treaty is intended to be a 
settlement of claims, a new political relationship will not be successful if it is built 
on ignoring the past. A treaty may mark a liminal moment signifying a commitment 
on behalf of the settler-State to acknowledge injustice it carried out and legitimate 
its possession, but it does not close off that history. Reconciliation is not achieved 
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by signing a treaty, but is an ‘ongoing process of engagement and discussion’.103 A 
treaty is a marriage, not a divorce.104  
This first-principles approach reveals that in order to constitute a treaty, an 
agreement must satisfy three criteria. First, it must recognise Indigenous peoples as 
a polity, distinctive from other citizens of the State on the basis of their status as 
prior self-governing communities. Second, the agreement must be reached by a fair 
negotiation process conducted in good faith and in a manner respectful of each 
participant’s standing as a polity. Third, the agreement must contain more than mere 
symbolic recognition; it must recognise or establish some form of decision-making 
and control that amounts to at least a limited form of self-government.  
B Modern Treaty-making in Canada 
Canada’s long history of entering into agreements between Indigenous peoples and 
the State is instructive for understanding what the term ‘treaty’ should mean in 
Australia today. In this section, we examine treaties signed between First Nations and 
the Canadian Crown, especially in British Columbia, in light of our refined standard. 
Relationships between the Indigenous peoples of North America and 
colonists were initially based on lucrative trading arrangements. Eventually, in the 
18th century, British and French competition for control of land catalysed treaty-
making, as both sides formed strategic alliances with First Nations to advance their 
interests on the continent. After the British had established themselves as the 
dominant colonial power, King George III issued the Royal Proclamation Act of 
1763.105 The Act restricted colonial expansion westwards, guaranteeing Aboriginal 
‘Nations or Tribes’ undisturbed possession of their territories, unless purchased by 
the Crown or ceded via treaty. In recognising Aboriginal claims to ownership and 
control, the Proclamation serves as an important and early commitment by the 
Crown to respect the sovereignty of First Nations peoples.106 Increasing numbers of 
settlers placed strain on the borders established by the Proclamation, however, and 
led to the negotiation of land surrender treaties. Described as the ‘era of unsystematic 
treaty making’,107 these agreements led Indigenous peoples to surrender large tracts 
of land to the British in return for defined reserves, annual payments, and rights to 
hunt, fish and undertake cultural activities over their traditional lands.  
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After the Confederation of Canada in 1867, a new form of treaty-making 
emerged. Between 1871 and 1921, the Crown entered into treaties with various First 
Nations to pursue settlement, agriculture, and resource development in the West and 
North.108 These eleven ‘Numbered Treaties’ involved similar exchanges to those 
treaties prior to 1867. In exchange for extinguishing their land rights, First Nations 
typically received limited reserve land, monetary compensation, hunting and 
gathering rights across a wider area, tools for farming and hunting, and schooling.109 
While the Government intended the treaties to enable the assimilation of Aboriginal 
peoples into European society,110 the First Nations themselves sought to protect their 
traditions and culture from increasing intervention.111 The signing of Treaty 11 
between several First Nations in the Northwest Territories and King George V in 
1921–22 marked the final numbered treaty. It is important to note, however, that the 
situation in British Columbia in Western Canada was unique. Fourteen treaties of 
limited scope had been negotiated on Vancouver Island prior to 1854,112 and 
Treaty 8 extended partially into the north-eastern part of the province. The rest of 
the province, comprising 85 per cent of the land mass, was not — and had never 
been — subject to treaties, and successive governments refused to enter negotiations 
with Aboriginal peoples until Indigenous activism eventually forced the British 
Columbia Government’s hand.  
1 Resurgence of Treaty-making 
The modern treaty-making process developed out of the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
1973 decision in Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia.113 In Calder, the 
Nisga’a Tribal Council sought a declaration that their Aboriginal title in the Nass 
Valley of north-western British Columbia had never been lawfully extinguished. 
One justice did not consider the question, instead deciding that the Court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the case,114 leaving six justices to rule on the merits. All six 
held that Aboriginal title could exist,115 though splitting evenly on whether the 
Nisga’a title continued to exist.116 As such, the appeal was dismissed 4:3. 
Although a majority of the Court dismissed the Nisga’a challenge, the 
decision in Calder was momentous, with six justices holding that Aboriginal title is 
part of Canadian law. This finding prompted the Government of Prime Minister 
Trudeau to reassess ‘the colonialist assumptions underlying [its] aboriginal policy, 
and to acknowledge the possibility of Aboriginal self-determination, aboriginal and 
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treaty rights, and self-government as key organizing principles’.117 Less than seven 
months after the decision was handed down, the Government announced a new 
comprehensive land claims policy, under which it would ‘negotiate with the 
representatives of Aboriginal peoples on the basis that where their traditional interest 
in the lands concerned can be established, an agreed form of compensation or benefit 
would be provided’.118 This approach was reiterated in a 1981 policy statement 
explaining that ‘Canada would now negotiate settlements with Aboriginal groups 
where rights of traditional use and occupancy had been neither extinguished by 
treaty nor “superseded by law”’.119 These negotiated agreements largely borrowed 
from the Numbered Treaties, requiring First Nations to extinguish their rights in land 
in exchange for more limited, defined rights and monetary compensation.120 
A dispute over the construction of an extensive hydroelectric scheme in 
Northern Quebec proved the first test of Canada’s new approach towards Indigenous 
peoples. Construction had commenced pre-Calder, and the Quebec Government had 
not consulted with the Cree and Inuit peoples whose territory would be flooded. An 
injunction was successfully sought in the Quebec Superior Court,121 blocking 
construction until an agreement was negotiated. Although the Quebec Court of 
Appeal later dismissed the injunction, the legal requirement that an agreement be 
reached remained in force.122 Economic and political concerns pressured the parties 
into a quick process, and the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (‘JBNQA’) 
was signed within two years, on 11 November 1975.123 The first modern agreement 
between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state, the JBNQA settled Aboriginal 
land claims with the Canadian and Quebec governments. Under the Agreement, the 
provincial and federal governments transferred 5543km2 to the Cree and 8151km2 
to the Inuit,124 as well as exclusive harvesting rights over an additional 15 000km2, 
and agreed to pay CA$225 million over 20 years to a newly established Cree 
Regional Authority and Inuit Makivik Corporation.125 These bodies were officially 
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granted delegated legislative powers under the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act.126 In 
return, the Cree and Inuit surrendered Aboriginal title to 981 610 km2 of the James 
Bay/Ungava territory.127 Although heavily criticised for failing to insulate the 
negotiations from the broader political and economic climate,128 the JBNQA 
recognises the Cree and Inuit as polities, and guarantees a limited right to 
self-government with some law-making power.129 
Notwithstanding the decision in Calder, the British Columbia Government 
refused to recognise Aboriginal title. Once again, it was left to judicial authorities 
further exploring the scope of Aboriginal interests in land to propel the Government 
to the negotiating table.130 In Guerin v The Queen, four judges of the Supreme Court 
declared that Aboriginal title was not created by the Royal Proclamation Act of 1763, 
but rather was derived from the historical occupation and possession by Aboriginal 
people of their tribal lands.131 In declaring that Aboriginal title is a pre-existing legal 
right, the plurality held that Aboriginal title continued to exist on traditional lands 
not subject to treaties with the Crown and on reserve lands in British Columbia.132 
One year later, in MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v Mullin, the Court of Appeal of British 
Columbia issued a temporary injunction to stop logging on Meares Island in order 
that the Clayoquot and Ahousaht bands could record and preserve evidence of their 
title.133 After the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, further injunctions 
were sought and issued, halting resource extraction and construction throughout the 
province.134 As McKee notes, natural resource development companies and the 
Government began to consider whether their own interests would be better served if 
they entered treaty negotiations.135 The Supreme Court’s 1990 intervention in R v 
Sparrow, where it unanimously held that the 1982 constitutional recognition of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights ‘renounces the old rules of the game’ and ‘calls for a 
just settlement for [A]boriginal peoples’,136 added to pressure on the British 
Columbia Government. 
2 The British Columbia Treaty Process 
The British Columbia Treaty Claims Taskforce was established on 3 December 
1990. The Taskforce was set up largely to support First Nations, which did not want 
‘to be caught without a thoughtful, strategic position or to be put into a position 
where they could be outflanked by more skilled government negotiators’.137 
Established as a tripartite body, it was composed of seven Commissioners, two 
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appointed by each non-Aboriginal government (federal and provincial), and three by 
First Nations. Consistent with a fair negotiation process, the extra appointee was 
intended to ‘counteract a potential power imbalance between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal representatives’, as well as more accurately represent interests of 
First Nations located across British Columbia.138 After six months of consultations, 
the Taskforce made 19 recommendations, all of which were accepted by the three 
parties. The parties agreed to ‘establish a new relationship based on mutual trust, 
respect, and understanding — through political negotiations’, and establish the 
British Columbia Treaty Commission (‘BCTC’) ‘to facilitate the process of 
negotiations’,139 symbolising ‘a formal commitment to negotiate modern day 
treaties’.140 
Established on 15 April 1993, the BCTC is an independent and impartial 
body.141 It is composed of five commissioners, two appointed by First Nations, one 
each by the Federal Government and the Provincial Government, and one further 
commissioner agreed to by the three parties. The BCTC facilitates treaty 
negotiations by ‘monitoring developments and by providing, when necessary, 
methods of dispute resolution’.142 As of March 2018, 57 First Nations are 
participating, and eight have completed treaties under the process.143 
While each of the eight treaties adopted thus far is specific to the particular 
First Nation, as well as place, history and circumstance, they share a number of 
common elements relating to land, resources, governance, finance, and cultural 
heritage.144 These common elements assist in elaborating our understanding of what 
outcomes are likely to be reached under a treaty. The treaties evidence that a land 
base is a critical precondition for the exercise of self-government. Under the treaties, 
a portion of the First Nation’s territory is transferred in fee simple for the exclusive 
use of the First Nation. This includes rights over subsurface resources. Under the 
Maa-nulth First Nations Final Agreement, for example, the Huu-ay-aht First Nation 
receives 1077 hectares of former Indian Reserves, and 7181 hectares of additional 
lands.145 Exclusive resource rights are guaranteed within the First Nation’s territory, 
with more restrictive resource rights accorded in areas outside their territorial limits. 
These rights are subject to conservation, as well as public health and safety 
legislation.146 In areas outside the First Nation’s territory, certain land use decisions 
are subject to planning, consultation and joint management.  
Most significant, however, are the self-government provisions. Under each 
treaty, a degree of Aboriginal self-government is recognised. For instance, ch 3 of 
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the Yale First Nation Final Agreement provides that the parties ‘acknowledge’ the 
right of self-government and governance of the Yale First Nation, and sets out the 
principles governing the to-be-drafted Constitution, as well as their governance 
structure, and jurisdiction.147 Likewise, ch 15 of the Tla’amin Final Agreement 
provides that the Tla’amin Nation ‘has the right to self-government and the authority 
to make laws, as set out in this Agreement’.148 Jurisdiction recognised under each 
treaty typically includes the administration of justice, family and social services, 
healthcare, and language and cultural education, though federal and provincial law 
applies where an inconsistency or conflict arises.149  
These treaties are useful in providing a comparative validation of our 
standard of what should be regarded as a treaty between Indigenous peoples and the 
state. First, in all settlements so far adopted, the status of the First Nations as a polity 
is expressly acknowledged. Interestingly, however, the language is not definitive. 
The First Nations ‘asserts’ or ‘claims’ aboriginal rights based on their ‘assertion’ of 
a unique connection with land, the Constitution ‘recognises and affirms’ these rights, 
and the State ‘acknowledge[s] the perspective’ of the First Nation ‘that harm and 
losses in relation to its aboriginal rights have occurred in the past’, expressing ‘regret 
if any acts or omissions of the Crown have contributed to that perspective’.150 
Nonetheless, despite the tentative language, through this acknowledgement, the 
distinctive status of First Nations is unambiguously recognised.  
Second, the rigid BCTC process involves six stages, which aims at preventing 
ad hoc negotiations, and enabling each First Nation to negotiate on the basis of clear 
and established rules and criteria.151 This ensures that the negotiations are structured 
in a manner that minimises the risk that power and resource disparities will influence 
the terms of the agreement, and is a considerable departure from both the historical 
treaties and the JBNQA. Finally, consistent with art 4 of the UNDRIP, all treaties 
recognise a degree of self-government over internal and local affairs, and provide 
for shared decision-making over additional domains. Despite some criticism that 
such self-governance rights are subordinate to the Canadian State,152 it is consistent 
with modern treaties that are premised on the overriding sovereignty of the State. 
3 The Nisga’a Final Agreement 
Despite the setback in Calder, the Nisga’a people continued to advocate for 
recognition of their lawful title. After a long process, the Nisga’a were finally 
successful. First signed in 1998 and eventually ratified in April 2000, the Nisga’a 
Final Agreement was the 14th modern treaty signed in Canada and the first in British 
Columbia. Although conducted outside the BCTC, the Treaty contains a similar 
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pattern: in exchange for a ‘full and final settlement’ in respect of the Nisga’a 
Aboriginal rights,153 the federal and provincial governments recognised Nisga’a 
rights to, inter alia, land, resources, culture, finance and self-governance. 
Under the Treaty, the Nisga’a receive ownership in fee simple to 2000km2 of 
traditional territory in the Nass Valley. Although comprising only eight per cent of 
their traditional lands, the Nisga’a retain control and jurisdiction over the use and 
development of these lands and the forest and mineral resources.154 Similarly to other 
treaties, the Nisga’a gain additional resource rights over more extensive territory. 
This includes the right to hunt (for food, or social and ceremonial purposes) in over 
16 000km2 of land and the right to enact laws to regulate their hunt,155 as well as the 
right to fish in over 20 000km2 of land, and an attendant right to enact laws to 
regulate their fishery as well as establish and operate commercial fisheries.156 The 
Nisga’a exercise their right to self-government via the Nisga’a Lisims Government, 
36-member Wilp Si’ayuukhl Nisga’a (legislature) and four village councils. The 
Nisga’a have legislative authority over matters that directly affect the identity of the 
Nisga’a nation, including lands, language culture, education, health, child 
protection, traditional healing practice, fisheries, wildlife, forestry, environmental 
protection and policing.157 Notwithstanding the broad ranging jurisdiction, its extent 
is limited in scope: federal and provincial laws apply where an inconsistency or 
conflict arises.158 In addition, the provincial and federal governments committed to 
CA$280 million in capital transfers over 14 years to satisfy outstanding claims, and 
CA$38 million per year under five-year fiscal financial agreements to fund the 
operation of the Nisga’a government, so as to enable it to provide public services ‘at 
levels reasonably comparable to those generally prevailing in northwest British 
Columbia’.159 
The Nisga’a self-government powers were challenged by the conservative 
Liberal Party of British Columbia. Premier Gordon Campbell argued that the treaty 
provisions were inconsistent with the Canadian Constitution, which exhaustively 
distributes powers between the federal and provincial governments, extinguishing 
any right to self-government of the Indigenous peoples. In contrast, the Nisga’a 
argued that land and rights to hunt and fish would be ‘empty gestures’ if they have 
no concomitant power to ‘establish rules about the use of that land and those 
rights’.160 Justice Williamson of the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed 
the challenge, holding that the right to Aboriginal title ‘include[s] the right for the 
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community to make decisions as to the use of the land and therefore the right to have 
a political structure for making those decisions’.161 
Similar to treaties signed under the British Columbia process, the Nisga’a 
Final Agreement illustrates how our criteria may be applied in practice. First, the 
treaty recognises that the Nisga’a were prior owners and occupiers of the land now 
claimed by Canada, and that they are a distinctive polity. As the Nisga’a Citizenship 
Act 2008 (Nisga’a Lisims) signifies, the Nisga’a may continue to live as a distinct 
society within Canada,162 enjoying rights under both regimes. Second, the 
Agreement was negotiated in a manner respectful and reflective of the Nisga’a status 
as a polity, and structured in such a way to minimise the risk that significant 
disparities in power would affect the terms of the agreement. Third, the Agreement 
recognises culturally appropriate forms of decision-making (in this case, amounting 
to a limited degree of self-government in internal matters) and provides finance to 
ensure its continuous functioning. 
4 Lessons from the Canadian Process  
The modern treaty-making process in Canada offers insights into how we should 
understand treaties in Australia today. Reflecting on the Nisga’a Final Agreement 
and the process in British Columbia, Krehbiel argues that ‘at its core, treaty making 
in Canada has historically focused on a relatively straight-forward package of 
benefits for the First Nation in exchange for extinguishment of its land-based 
interests within a defined territory’.163 The package of benefits includes recognising 
rights to land, resources, governance, and cultural heritage, as well as providing 
initial and recurring financial compensation in order to enable First Nations to 
finance their autonomous functions — consistent with art 4 of the UNDRIP. It is 
through these political agreements that the State: acknowledges Indigenous 
communities as ‘polities’; commits to recognising or establishing culturally 
appropriate structures of decision-making and control that amount to a form of self-
government; and legitimises its own sovereignty.  
Despite some concerns over process and outcomes, modern treaty-making in 
Canada reveals that success is important for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
peoples. For non-Indigenous peoples, the treaties legitimate the Canadian State’s 
claim of sovereignty, and provide ‘a solid legal basis for future economic 
development’.164 More significantly, for First Nations the treaties confirm that, as 
polities, power and authority resides in the First Nations themselves. As such, they 
are a medium through which, in the words of Edward Allen, CEO of the Nisga’a 
Lisims Government, ‘we have negotiated our way into Canada, to be full and equal 
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participants of Canadian society’.165 Indeed, at their highest, the treaty relationship 
is a symbol of equal partnership, based on ‘mutual recognition and sharing’.166 At 
the same time, each treaty represents the resilience of the Indigenous nation. As 
Chief Joseph Gosnell remarked at the signing of the Nisga’a Final Agreement at 
New Aiyansh in August 1998: ‘Look around you. Look at our faces. We are the 
survivors of a long journey. We intend to live here forever. And, under the Nisga’a 
Treaty, we will flourish.’167 
Consideration of the modern treaty-making process also throws into relief the 
historic agreements struck between First Nations and the British or Canadian State. 
Although treaties from the ‘unsystematic’ era onwards recognised Indigenous peoples 
as rightful holders of title to their traditional lands, they were assimilative instruments 
designed to further the economic goals of non-Indigenous peoples. They were not 
intended to secure a just political relationship, but to ‘settle’ ‘once and for all’168  
First Nations claims to their land so that the Crown could exploit natural resources 
within First Nations territory. Infected by outdated attitudes, these agreements do not 
recognise Indigenous governance structures, but subsumed Indigenous peoples within 
the non-Indigenous governmental system.169 Although both the Canadian State and 
First Nations who signed these agreements consider them to be treaties, and their 
existence legitimates the status and aspirations of those Indigenous nations who signed 
the agreements, they would not satisfy our criteria. 
III Treaties in Australia 
A Background 
In the process of colonising Australia, Captain James Cook was instructed to take 
possession of the ‘Convenient Situations in the Country’ ‘with the Consent of the 
Natives’.170 Arthur Phillip, the first Governor of New South Wales, instructed his 
forces to ‘endeavour by every possible means to open an Intercourse with the 
Natives and to conciliate their affections’, ‘to live in amity and kindness with 
them’.171 Despite this, the British and the respective colonial governments never 
sought to formalise the relationship with Indigenous peoples. Rather, based on the 
doctrine of terra nullius, colonisation preceded on the foundation that the continent 
																																																								
165 Edward Allen, ‘Our Treaty, Our Inherent Right to Self-Government: An Overview of the Nisga’a 
Final Agreement’ (2004) 11(3) International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 233, 234. 
166 Nisga’a Final Agreement preamble. 
167 Joseph Gosnell, ‘No Longer Beggars in Our Own Lands, We Now Go Forward …’, Vancouver Sun 
(Vancouver), 5 August 1998, A11, quoted in Douglas Sanders, ‘“We Intend to Live Here Forever”: 
A Primer on the Nisga’a Treaty’ (2000) 33(1) University of British Columbia Law Review 103, 103. 
168 Kenneth S Coates and William R Morrison, ‘Treaty Research Report — Treaty No 11 (1921)’ 
(Research Report, Treaties and Historical Research Centre, 1986) 17 (citations omitted). 
169 Gerald Taiaiake Alfred, ‘Colonialism and State Dependency’ (2009) 5(2) Journal of Aboriginal 
Health 42, 46. 
170 Secret Instructions from Baron Ed Hawke, Sir Piercy Brett and Lord C Spencer to James Cook,  
30 July 1768, 1: Museum of Australian Democracy, ‘Secret Instructions to Lieutenant Cook 30 July 
1768 (UK)’, Documenting Democracy <https://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/item-sdid-67.html>. 
171 Governor Phillip’s Instructions, 25 April 1778, Historical Records of Australia, series 1, vol 1 (1914) 
13–14. 
2018] THE NOONGAR SETTLEMENT: AUSTRALIA’S FIRST TREATY 23 
was ‘vacant’,172 ‘a tract of territory practically unoccupied, without settled 
inhabitants or settled law’.173 This understanding meant ad hoc agreements, like 
those signed by John Batman with a group of Wurundjeri elders around present-day 
Melbourne,174 and George Augustus Robinson’s ‘friendly mission’ in Tasmania,175 
never received official sanction. 
It is not clear why the British never signed a treaty with the Indigenous 
peoples of Australia.176 The absence, however, clearly affected western political and 
legal constructions of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples; as early as 1836, 
for example, the Supreme Court of New South Wales declared that Aboriginal 
people had no law and only ‘the wildest most indiscriminatory notions of 
revenge’.177 This attitude operated to exclude Indigenous peoples from the protection 
of the State and justified colonial governments usurping Indigenous lands.178 
Ongoing agitation about the legitimacy of the Australian nation galvanised 
Indigenous activism and non-Indigenous supporters in the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike 
Canada, however, legal and political avenues proved less effective. 
In 1971, the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory considered a challenge 
by the Yolngu people who sought a declaration that they enjoyed legal rights to their 
traditional land. In Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd, Blackburn J rejected the Yolngu 
people’s claim of native title over the Gove peninsula.179 Despite ruling against the 
Yolngu, Blackburn J held that they possessed ‘a subtle and highly elaborate’ system 
of laws,180 and, in a confidential memorandum to Government and Opposition, noted 
that the morality of a system of Aboriginal land rights was ‘beyond question’.181 
After nine months of deliberation, however, Prime Minister William McMahon 
announced that the Government would not legislate to permit Aboriginal title to 
land. Instead, Aboriginal people would be encouraged to apply for leases, which 
would be considered, provided that the land was put to ‘reasonable’ economic or 
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social use.182 In response to McMahon’s statement, four young Aboriginal men 
drove from Redfern to Canberra and established a tent embassy on the lawns in front 
of Parliament House.183 The ramshackle collection of tents served as a potent 
‘symbol of unextinguished Indigenous sovereignty’, catalysing calls for a treaty.184  
Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, treaty-talk was common. Later in 
1971, the Larrakia people organised a petition to Queen Elizabeth II, describing 
themselves as ‘refugees in the country of our ancestors’, and calling for land rights 
and political representation.185 In 1979, the National Aboriginal Conference, an 
elected Indigenous body advising government, passed a resolution calling for a 
‘Makarrata’.186 In the same year, the Aboriginal Treaty Committee, a voluntary, 
non-government private body composed of prominent non-Indigenous Australians 
was established, helping to build political momentum for a treaty among the 
non-Indigenous community.187 In 1983, the Senate Standing Committee on 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs delivered a report on the idea of a treaty, 
recommending constitutional change in order to implement a ‘compact’.188 Finally, 
in 1988, Prime Minister Bob Hawke adopted the Barunga Statement, promising to 
negotiate a treaty to respect and recognise Aboriginal sovereignty within the term of 
the 35th Parliament.189 Met with hostile opposition from the Coalition, who 
considered it ‘a recipe for separatism’ and ‘an absurd proposition that a nation should 
make a treaty with some of its own citizens’,190 the treaty did not eventuate, and was 
quietly shelved in 1991. 
1 Native Title Processes 
Statutory land rights regimes had been enacted in all states except for Western 
Australia and Tasmania by 1991.191 While some of these settlements delivered 
expansive rights — most notably the Pitjantjatjara Agreement, which provided 
direct grants of inalienable freehold land192 — many were ‘much more limited in 
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scope’.193 Importantly, however, ‘absent any legally enforceable right to land, these 
settlements remained essentially ad hoc, limited in utility for other Indigenous 
peoples, and predicated on a supportive political environment’.194 The High Court 
of Australia’s decision in Mabo v Queensland (No 2),195 and subsequent enactment 
of the NTA, radically altered this underlying framework, transforming Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ moral claims into legal rights.196 The NTA 
recognises and protects Indigenous Australians’ native title and establishes a 
procedure for dealing with native title claims. 
Agreements under the NTA bear formal similarities to treaty negotiations. 
Similar to the process in Canada, the legal architecture of the NTA privileges 
conciliation rather than litigation. While applications for a ‘determination of native 
title’ are initially commenced as proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia,197 the 
Court practises an intensive case management scheme to identify points of 
agreement, and to refer particular issues to mediation.198 As of 5 March 2018,  
416 native title determinations have been made.199 Of these, 328 were by consent,  
47 were litigated, and 41 were unopposed.200 
Even where the parties agree to conciliation, the process can be lengthy. 
Determination of native title operates as a judgment against the ‘world at large’,201 
therefore it is critical that all parties ‘who hold or wish to assert a claim or interest 
in respect of the defined area of land’ are represented.202 This may include several 
Indigenous nations with conflicting claims over land, not to mention pastoralists, 
mining interests and State and Federal Governments. As such, finalising areas of 
common ground can be difficult. It is not surprising then that negotiations can take 
several years, or more. For example, in November 2014, the Kokatha people were 
finally successful in finalising a consent determination that had taken 18 years.203 
The Kokatha native title claim covers over 33 807km2 of land, including significant 
pastoral leases such as Roxby Downs station, BHP Billiton’s Olympic Dam mine, 
and areas used by the Australian Government Department of Defence to conduct 
training operations. In addition to the significant land base, the Kokatha people are 
guaranteed non-exclusive rights to hunt, fish, camp, gather and undertake cultural 
activities including ceremonies and meetings, and to protect places of cultural 
significance on country.204 
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Several developments to simplify the process and expedite completed 
agreements have been enacted. Indigenous Land Use Agreements (‘ILUAs’) were 
introduced as part of the 1998 Amendments to the NTA.205 They are voluntary 
agreements that may be struck between native title groups and other groups 
concerning the use of land and waters. This creative process permits flexible and 
pragmatic settlements, and have proved popular for many native title groups. As of 
5 March 2018, there are 1199 ILUAs registered with the National Native Title 
Tribunal, compared to 406 native title determinations.206 ILUAs cover a diverse 
range of agreements, including, for example, providing for Indigenous access to 
pastoral leasehold, granting access to natural resources on native title land, 
compensation, or employment and economic opportunities for native title groups.207 
Agreement can be negotiated in the absence of a costly and lengthy application for 
the determination of the existence of native title,208 and, depending on the precise 
agreement struck, can ‘offer substantial scope for economic development’.209 Once 
registered, the ILUA binds the parties and all persons holding native title to the area, 
even if not a party to the agreement.210 However, despite some clear benefits and 
potential,211 ILUAs have fallen far below the comprehensive agreements struck in 
Canada or treaties more broadly. As their name suggests, ILUAs do not grant 
ownership over land, but concern use of land and waters.212  
Limitations under ILUAs are inherent to the NTA process, and while 
settlements reached under the NTA satisfy the first and second of our criteria, they 
fail the third, and do not constitute treaties. First, native title recognises Indigenous 
peoples as both traditional owners and occupiers of the land, and so as polities. The 
source of native title rights and interests is the system of traditional laws and customs 
of the Indigenous peoples themselves. As such, native title is ‘an acknowledgment 
of the continuation of Indigenous society as a source of authority’.213 Second, as the 
statistics indicate, native title is primarily reached by way of negotiation. Although 
Indigenous Australians seeking to claim native title find that the process is structured 
against their interests, negotiations are conducted on the basis that Indigenous 
																																																								
205 Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) sch 1 item 9, amending NTA pt 2 div 3 sub-div B. 
206 National Native Title Tribunal, above n 199. Though note that many native title consent 
determinations involve ILUAs. 
207 National Native Title Tribunal, About Indigenous Land Use Agreements (ILUAs) 
<http://www.nntt.gov.au/ILUAs/Pages/default.aspx>.  
208 Fred Tanner, ‘Land Rights, Native Title and Indigenous Land Use Agreements’ in Martin Hinton, 
Daryle Rigney and Elliott Johnson (eds), Indigenous Australians and the Law (Routledge, 2nd ed, 
2008) 147, 157. 
209 Maureen Tehan and Lee Godden, ‘Legal Forms and Their Implications for Long-Term Relationships 
and Economic, Cultural and Social Empowerment: Structuring Agreements in Australia’ in Marcia 
Langton and Judy Longbottom (eds), Community Futures, Legal Architecture: Foundations for 
Indigenous Peoples in the Global Mining Boom (Routledge, 2012) 111, 122. 
210 NTA s 24EA(1). See further Christos Mantziaris and David Martin, Native Title Corporations:  
A Legal and Anthropological Analysis (Federation Press, 2000) 250. 
211 Note that the Noongar Settlement is to be registered as six ILUAs, indicating that ILUAs have 
unrealised potential as part of a comprehensive negotiated agreement: see below Part IIIB. 
212 Lisa Strelein, ‘Symbolism and Function: From Native Title to Indigenous Self-Government’ in Lisa 
Strelein (ed), Dialogue About Land Justice: Papers from the National Native Title Conferences 
(Aboriginal Studies Press, 2010) 127, 131. 
213 Ibid 128.  
2018] THE NOONGAR SETTLEMENT: AUSTRALIA’S FIRST TREATY 27 
peoples, as prior owners and occupiers of their traditional land, are entitled to be 
present, rather than merely updated on its progress.  
Although agreements under the NTA regime recognise Indigenous peoples as 
polities, the State has not accepted, nor recognised, the concomitant inherent right 
to self-government. This is a fine distinction, but an important one. While basing the 
source of native title rights and interests in the normative system of the traditional 
owners suggests that the courts recognise an inherent right to self-government, 
legislation and case law has constrained the content of native title rights to ‘land and 
waters’214 and, at present, does not recognise a right to self-government.215 Further, 
NTA settlements acknowledge prescribed bodies corporate that act as trustees to hold 
and manage native title rights and interests,216 but these bodies are not granted even 
limited self-governance powers. Rather, they are merely intended to protect and 
manage native title and to ensure certainty for governments and other parties 
interested in accessing land and waters.217  
2 Non-Native Title Processes  
The limitations inherent in the NTA process have constrained Indigenous peoples’ 
ability to transform their moral interests into legally enforceable rights. As a result, 
calls for a fundamental rethink to the NTA have been made,218 propelling alternative, 
political agreements made outside the native title system. These arrangements 
provide greater flexibility and offer some economic benefits but fall short of the 
political agreements reached in Canada.  
The Traditional Owner Settlement Act 2010 (Vic) (‘TOSA’) is one such 
alternative. Designed ‘to advance reconciliation and promote good relations’ 
between the Victorian State and Indigenous Australians,219 the TOSA enables 
traditional owners to pursue a negotiated ‘recognition and settlement agreement’220 
with the State Government outside the native title regime. The overarching 
settlement agreement includes four sub-agreements relating to: land, land-use, 
funding, and natural resources.221 An ILUA is also registered under the NTA,222 
making the Agreement legally binding. As part of any agreement, the traditional 
owners must withdraw all current and future native title claims. 
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For many Indigenous peoples, the breadth of the available outcomes is 
appealing. So far two agreements with traditional owner groups, arising out of or 
complementing native title determinations, have been finalised. The Gunaikurnai 
Settlement Agreement was the first to be reached under the TOSA in October 2010. 
Under the Agreement, the State acknowledges the Gunaikurnai people as the 
traditional owners of an area in Gippsland, and recognises that they hold native title 
over certain Crown land in that region. In addition, the State: commits to funding the 
Gunaikurnai people to enable them to manage their affairs and respond to their 
obligations under the settlement; grants rights of access and use on Crown land for 
traditional purposes including hunting, fishing, camping and gathering; and invites 
the Gunaikurnai people to co-manage over ten national parks and reserves.223 In 
2013, the Dja Dja Wurrung people became the second to reach a settlement under 
the TOSA. The Dja Dja Wurrung Settlement includes: acknowledgement of past 
injustices; transfer of two historically and culturally significant freehold properties; 
six parks and reserves as ‘Aboriginal title’ and joint management of those lands; 
hunting, fishing and gathering rights; and almost $10 million in funding by the State 
for investment in economic development initiatives chosen by the Dja Dja 
Wurrung.224 The TOSA has only operated since 2010, but it has already been praised 
by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner as setting 
‘the benchmark for other states to meet when resolving native title claims’.225 
Both the Gunaikurnai and Dja Dja Wurrung settlements include joint 
management of land and resources as an integral element of the package. If 
conducted on a firm basis of formal recognition and active participation in decision-
making processes, collaborative land and resource management strategies can 
empower local communities.226 These processes also have the potential to break 
down the disjunction between Indigenous and non-Indigenous cultural norms, 
providing an opportunity for ‘cross-cultural development of management processes 
and conflict resolution’,227 reinforcing both the official acknowledgement of past 
injustices and grounding a just relationship going forward.228  
The TOSA process offers similar benefits to the negotiated treaties in Canada. 
Each begins with an acknowledgment of past injustices and recognition that the 
Indigenous peoples are the traditional owners of the land. A small portion of Crown 
land is transferred (neither permits private property to be transferred) as freehold 
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title or Aboriginal title; land use and access rights are granted over wider areas; and 
the First Nation or Traditional Owners are entitled to jointly manage additional parks 
or reserves. Significantly, the State commits to provide funding to Indigenous-run 
bodies whose role is to identify, protect and promote the interests of their 
community. Capital transfer packages are intended both to support Indigenous 
communities build capacity and as compensation for the ‘surrender’ of current and 
future claims. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of the TOSA regime, it is more limited than the 
Canadian agreements and does not meet our criteria for a treaty. While Indigenous 
peoples are recognised as a polity, and negotiation is conducted respectful of each 
participant’s equality of standing, the TOSA process does not recognise Indigenous 
self-government to a sufficient extent. Rather, self-government is limited merely to 
joint management of national parks and reserves.229 Joint management arrangements 
can bring benefits to Indigenous peoples, and — importantly — the traditional owner 
land management boards will be composed of a majority of members appointed from 
nominations made by the traditional owner group,230 so decisions can be made 
without the consent of non-Indigenous members. Nonetheless, the scope of decision-
making power is minimal. Absent broader powers of decision-making, the 
Gunaikurnai and Dja Dja Wurrung bodies are limited to a communication channel 
with government as service-delivery organisations. Additionally, and 
problematically, not all activities that have a significant impact on the rights of 
traditional owners require their consent,231 weakening their ability to manage their 
land and community as required under art 32 of the UNDRIP. These agreements are 
a positive step forward, with the potential to avoid lengthy negotiations under the 
NTA,232 but they are not treaties.  
B The Noongar Settlement  
The Noongar people live in the south-west corner of Western Australia. Traditionally, 
their country extended from Jurien Bay to the southern coast, and east to 
Ravensthorpe and Southern Cross, some 200 000km2.233 Over this wide expanse of 
land, different subgroups of Noongar people — the Ballardong, Yued, Whadjuk, 
Wardandi, Pinjarup, Bibbulmun, Wilman, and Mineng — live, but they constitute 
one community, speaking dialects of a common language.234 From time immemorial, 
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through the British acquisition of sovereignty in 1829, and still today, the Noongar 
people have observed their traditional laws and customs.235 
The Noongar Settlement has its origins in a native title claim. During the 
1990s and early 2000s, the South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council 
(‘SWALSC’) oversaw the amalgamation of six native title claims into a single claim 
encompassing the entirety of Noongar country. This claim area was divided by the 
Federal Court of Australia into two parts: Part A encompassing Perth and the 
surrounding non-urban areas; and Part B covering the rest of the claim. In 2006, 
Wilcox J of the Federal Court examined Part A, and determined that the Noongar 
people held native title rights to occupy, use and enjoy lands and waters.236 Hailed 
as the first decision recognising native title over a capital city,237 it was subsequently 
overturned by the Full Federal Court in 2008.238 Instead of continuing litigation, in 
December 2009, the SWALSC and the State Government agreed to pursue a 
negotiated outcome outside of the NTA. Four years later, in July 2013, the 
Government released the terms of its settlement offer and, in October 2014, the 
SWALSC Noongar Nation Negotiation Team, and the Western Australia 
Government reached an agreement-in-principle on the text of the settlement. The 
Settlement takes the form of six ILUAs for the original six specific claim areas. 
Despite some opposition, these were approved by the Noongar people at a series of 
authorisation meetings held between January and March 2015.239 On 2 February 
2017, those opposing the deal were successful in preventing four of the ILUAs from 
being registered, with the Federal Court holding that the NTA requires all native title 
claimants to agree.240 Illustrating the political nature of agreements with Indigenous 
peoples, however, the Federal Government swiftly introduced legislation to amend 
the NTA in order to permit the settlement to proceed.241 Following a Senate 
Committee Report, the Bill was passed in June 2017.242 Applications to register the 
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1 What Does the Settlement Contain? 
The Noongar Settlement is the largest and ‘most comprehensive’244 agreement to 
settle Aboriginal interests in land in Australian history, comprising ‘the full and final 
resolution of all native title claims in the South West of Western Australia, … in 
exchange for a comprehensive settlement package’.245 The Noongar people have 
agreed to surrender any native title rights and interests that exist in the area under 
the Agreement, and consent to the validation of all potentially historically invalid 
acts in relation to those areas.246 As the preamble to the Land Administration (South 
West Native Title Settlement) Act 2016 (WA) makes clear, the package of benefits is 
intended to compensate the Noongar people ‘for the loss, surrender, diminution, 
impairment and other effects’ levied on their native title rights and interests.247 
Involving approximately 30 000 Noongar people and covering approximately 
200 000km2, the total value of the package is $1.3 billion, and includes agreement 
on rights, obligations and opportunities relating to land, resources, governance, 
finance, and cultural heritage. 
First, as part of the Agreement, the Western Australian Parliament enacted 
the Noongar (Koorah, Nitja, Boordahwan) (Past, Present, Future) Recognition Act 
2016 (WA). The first piece of legislation in Western Australia to include the 
Noongar language,248 the Act recognises the Noongar people as the traditional 
owners and occupiers of South West Western Australia, and their continued 
relationship with country.249 The Preamble acknowledges in full:  
A. Since time immemorial, the Noongar people have inhabited lands in 
the south-west of the State; these lands the Noongar people call 
Noongar boodja (Noongar earth).  
B. Under Noongar law and custom, the Noongar people are the traditional 
owners of, and have cultural responsibilities and rights in relation to, 
Noongar boodja.  
C. The Noongar people continue to have a living cultural, spiritual, 
familial and social relationship with Noongar boodja. 
D. The Noongar people have made, are making, and will continue to 
make, a significant and unique contribution to the heritage, cultural 
identity, community and economy of the State.  
E. The Noongar people describe in Schedule 1 their relationship to 
Noongar boodja and the benefits that all Western Australians derive 
from that relationship.  
F.  So it is appropriate, as part of a package of measures in full and final 
settlement of all claims by the Noongar people in pending and future 
applications under the Native Title Act 1993 (Commonwealth) for the 
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determination of native title and for compensation payable for acts 
affecting that native title, to recognise the Noongar people as the 
traditional owners of the lands described in this Act.250 
In the second reading speech, the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Peter 
Collier, acknowledged the deep injustices that had been done to the Noongar people 
since the British arrival in 1826. He recounted the ‘one-sided struggle over land and 
resources’, the ‘devastating spread of introduced diseases’, the hardening of attitudes 
towards Aboriginal people at the turn of the 20th century and the ‘repressive and 
coercive system of control’ mandated by the Aborigines Act 1905 (WA), the impact 
of which ‘still resonates throughout Western Australian society’.251 And yet, despite 
this ‘history of oppression and marginalisation’, the ‘Noongar people have survived’ 
and continue ‘to assert their rights and identity’.252 During debate over the Bill, 
parliamentarians frequently reiterated the significance of this acknowledgement. 
Antonio Buti, MLA noted that it indicated that the Government ‘has understood that 
it is important to recognise the legal, historical and moral rights of traditional 
owners’,253 while David Kelly MLA lauded the Bill and called for further 
negotiations across the State.254  
Establishing and resourcing governance institutions is an integral aspect of 
the settlement. Six Noongar Regional Corporations and one Central Services 
Corporation will be created, and will receive $10 million in funding support each 
year for 12 years. A capital works program will commit additional funding to build 
office accommodation and a Noongar Cultural Centre. The Central Services 
Corporation is responsible for assisting and providing services to the Regional 
Corporations. It will act as a centralised administrative body with the capacity and 
professional expertise to maintain, protect and promote the culture, customs, 
traditions and language of the Noongar people. The Regional Corporations will have 
a similar role, but will also be responsible for managing the traditional land and 
waters within their regions, developing regional priorities and engaging with 
government and third-party stakeholders to further the community interests and 
priorities of the Noongar people.  
The settlement includes a significant transfer of land to the Noongar people. 
Approximately 320 000 hectares of Crown land will be transferred into the Noongar 
Boodja Trust (‘NBT’) over five years, establishing a sizeable land estate upon which 
the Noongar people can exercise self-determination.255 The NBT will function as a 
perpetual trust, upon which the Western Australia Government will make funding 
instalments of $50 million (indexed) yearly for 12 years. As noted above, capital 
transfer payments are key elements of any broader settlement, as it demonstrates an 
understanding that economic development is critical to securing a just and equitable 
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relationship between Indigenous peoples and the State. It also guarantees the 
continued functioning of Indigenous institutions, as required under art 4 of the 
UNDRIP. Additionally, 121 freehold properties will be refurbished and transferred 
to the NBT as part of a Housing Program. 
The settlement also grants certain rights to the Noongar people over Crown 
lands not transferred. As part of the Agreement, the Minister for Lands must grant a 
land and water access licence to each Regional Corporation to allow the group to 
access and undertake customary activities on certain unallocated Crown land and 
unmanaged reserves.256 Subject to the licence, the Noongar people will be able to: 
visit and care for sites and country; gather, prepare and consume bush tucker and 
traditional medicine; conduct ceremonies and cultural activities; have meetings, 
camp and light camp or ceremonial fires on country.257 Similarly to the Gunaikurnai 
and Dja Dja Wurrung settlements, the Noongar people will be invited to co-manage 
land and resources in land outside their territory. Although no joint-management 
agreement has yet been struck, the overarching negotiated settlement set out 
prescriptive parameters over future agreements. Joint-management decisions will be 
made by a body composed of up to 12 persons; six nominated by the Noongar 
Regional Corporation, and six by the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of 
Parks and Wildlife; a chairperson will be nominated by the Corporation.258 This body 
will make all management decisions relating to the management and development 
of the Park, including on the value of the land and waters to the culture and heritage 
of Noongar people, and the methods to determine, conserve, protect and 
rehabilitate.259 As has been noted above, joint-management arrangements have the 
potential to improve employment opportunities for Indigenous peoples. 
Enhanced employment and socio-economic opportunities are a key element 
of the Settlement. To this end, the Agreement proposes to develop a Community 
Development Framework and a Noongar Economic Participation Framework. These 
initiatives aim to improve Western Australian human services agencies’ 
communication and collaboration with Noongar people, and to improve economic 
participation outcomes for Noongar people in the South West. Finally, the settlement 
contains two complementary heritage protection agreements. The Noongar Heritage 
Partnership Agreement will set out a framework through which the Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs and the relevant Regional Corporation can work in partnership to 
identify, record, protect and manage Noongar Heritage values and sites within the 
agreement area. The Noongar Standard Heritage Agreement will improve processes 
for the preservation of heritage. The Noongar Settlement is far-reaching, but is it 
Australia’s first treaty?  
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2 Is the Noongar Settlement a Treaty?  
There is common agreement that the Noongar Settlement is a milestone in the history 
of Western Australia. In the second reading speech on the Noongar Recognition Bill, 
Premier Colin Barnett explained that the settlement is the ‘most comprehensive 
native title agreement proposed’ in Australia.260 Other members of the Western 
Australia Parliament reiterated this. The Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Peter 
Collier, remarked that the Bill ‘has greater significance than simply one element of 
a native title agreement and will ultimately stand alone as a historic, overdue 
recognition of the Noongar people’.261 The Deputy Opposition Leader, Roger Cook 
noted that the Agreement ‘is the single most important thing this government can 
do’.262 Certainly, as McCagh writes, the ‘scale and scope of the package offered by 
the [Noongar Recognition] Bill are seemingly unprecedented’.263 
Scholars witnessing the negotiations and final agreement have contended that 
the Settlement reflects developments within native title dispute resolution. Young, 
for example, considers that the package ‘breaks new ground’ and reflects ‘an 
important maturing of native title dispute resolution’.264 Likewise Morris considers 
that the Agreement demonstrates that native title settlements can be expanded to 
‘include cultural redress, an accounting of history and formal apologies, in addition 
to land and financial compensation’.265 Morris argues that if this process was 
‘pursued wholeheartedly’ it could ‘help propel practical recognition of Indigenous 
languages and heritage, as has occurred in New Zealand’.266 Indeed, the Noongar 
nation’s ‘innovative’ comprehensive settlement ‘shows some of the potential that 
already exist’ for structuring an appropriate relationship between the State and 
Indigenous peoples.267 
Notwithstanding the significance of the Agreement, there has been little 
recognition that the Noongar Settlement may constitute the first treaty signed 
between Indigenous Australians and the State.268 Writing generally about the process 
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of regional agreements, Anker suggests that this reflects the Australian 
Government’s prioritisation of practical reconciliation, and aversion to the concept 
of Indigenous self-determination, and its potentially radical consequences.269 Anker 
appears correct; Western Australian legislators have generally chosen their words 
carefully, and in praising the process and outcomes of the Agreement have shied 
away from calling it a treaty, with some expressly rejecting the comparison.270 
Nonetheless, some parliamentarians have been less reticent. In the same debate, 
Peter Tinley, a member of the shadow ministry, lauded the settlement calling it ‘in 
effect’ a treaty and arguing that ‘it would be a fantastic outcome’ if it could be 
extended to ‘all Indigenous people in Western Australia’.271 Deputy Opposition 
Leader Cook also remarked on this fact. In debate on the Noongar Recognition Bill, 
Cook noted:  
By its very nature, the Noongar agreement is in fact a classic treaty; it is a 
coming together between two nations to agree upon certain things, and in 
doing so, finding a way forward together and recognising each other’s 
sovereignty. By recognising each other’s sovereignty, they decided how they 
would continue to coexist in a manner that they agreed to through negotiation. 
Yothu Yindi sung ‘treaty now’, and that is what we are doing here; this is a 
treaty between the government of Western Australia representing the 
newcomers, and the nation of the Noongar people.272 
Tinley and Cook are correct. The South West Native Title Settlement does more than 
augur a new development of native title negotiations: the Settlement is Australia’s 
first treaty between Indigenous peoples and the State.  
First, the treaty recognises the Noongar as both traditional owners of the land 
and as a distinct polity, differentiated from other Western Australians. Participants 
involved in the negotiation explicitly connected their aims to recognition of Noongar 
nationhood: at the initial negotiation meeting in 2010, the Noongar lead negotiator 
Glen Kelly, insisted on a ‘nation to nation’ dialogue;273 throughout the process the 
Noongar people identified as a nation, organised as a nation, and acted as a nation. 
This status was explicitly recognised by the conservative Western Australian 
Government. Upon notification that the Noongar people had voted to accept the 
Settlement, Premier Barnett issued a press release, noting that ‘break-through 
agreement’ was ‘a historic achievement in reconciliation’ and an ‘extraordinary act 
of self-determination by Aboriginal people…provid[ing] them with a real 
opportunity for independence’.274 In debates over the Recognition Bill, Deputy 
Opposition Leader Cook agreed, averring that the Settlement ‘is the single greatest 
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act of sovereignty by the Noongar nation since settlement’,275 and William Johnston, 
MLA lauded the Bill as providing ‘proper recognition of the Noongar people being 
not just the occupiers of the land, but the governing force of the land’.276  
Second, the Settlement was agreed to via a political negotiation respectful of 
each party’s equality of standing, evincing a commitment to secure a just 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the State. In recognising the Noongar 
nation, the Settlement emphasises the interconnectedness and interrelationship of 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians in South West Western Australia. 
Repeatedly highlighted is the idea that the Agreement is ‘ultimately an investment 
in both the Noongar community and the shared future of the Western Australian 
community as a whole’,277 because both communities ‘walk together in this 
journey’.278 Although Noongar nationhood is achieved subject to the overriding 
sovereignty of the Australian State, the treaty redefines the political relationship 
between Noongar and the Western Australian State, and achieves a just, equitable 
and sustainable settlement.  
The successful Agreement further emphasises the significance of negotiation 
outside rigid legal frameworks, as the appropriate process to resolve the political 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the State. Glen Kelly and Stuart 
Bradfield, CEO and Manager of Negotiations of the SWALSC respectively, have 
explained that the Noongar believed that the NTA process would prove inadequate 
for their aspirations. They recognised that in many areas of their country, native title 
rights had been extinguished, and where rights may be found to exist, Australian law 
would recognise rights only to non-exclusive use and possession. Further, much of 
the extinguishment occurred prior to the enactment of the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 (Cth), meaning that while ‘a win in the courts would provide formal 
recognition as traditional owners … it would provide little else’.279 
Third, the settlement contains more than mere symbolic recognition. In 
consideration of surrendering their native title rights and interests and validating all 
potentially invalid acts committed on their territory, the Noongar people receive a 
package of benefits similar to those negotiated under Canada’s modern treaty-
making process. The Noongar are guaranteed a sizeable land base, non-exclusive 
rights to resources over an extended area, a large and sustained financial contribution 
from the State Government, and enhanced cultural heritage protection. Together, 
these elements serve two goals key to any treaty: they acknowledge the injustices of 
the past, and serve the Noongar people’s future by strengthening culture and 
enhancing economic opportunities. It is true that the self-governance rights are not 
as extensive under the Noongar Settlement. There is no scope (at present) for a 
Noongar government, and the Noongar people are not entitled to pass legislation. 
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However, as we noted above, these elements are not necessary to constitute a treaty; 
what is required is the recognition or establishment, and resourcing, of institutions 
and structures of culturally appropriate governance and means of decision-making 
and control that amount to at least a limited form of self-government. Such a 
relationship is consistent with art 4 of the UNDRIP and the arrangements found in 
the modern treaty-making process in Canada. In this regard, the Central Services 
Corporation and the six Noongar Regional Corporations will develop and implement 
culturally appropriate policies based on local and regional priorities. Although 
similar in form to Registered Native Title Bodies Corporate, their substantial funding 
and key position within the broader settlement highlight the more significant role 
they will play. These bodies formalise self-governance arrangements, and may ‘pave 
the way’ for ‘robust forms of Indigenous jurisdiction’.280 The bodies also serve as 
conduit for engagement with the State Government and third parties, granting the 
Noongar people a ‘seat at the table’ of decision-making. 
The Noongar Settlement provides more than merely a seat at the table, 
however. As Kelly and Bradfield have explained, their goal was: 
to secure recognition and cultural and customary rights over our traditional 
lands, and consequently, to lay a platform of self-determination. We do not 
seek to be restricted to a marginal set of rights on a very limited amount of 
land. This means political empowerment and political status that enables a 
much higher level of control and influence over our affairs.281 
It is through the Central Services Corporation and six Regional Corporations, that 
the Noongar will exercise stronger, and more capable, institutions of Aboriginal 
governance, and, significantly, substantive decision-making and control. This 
control is sufficient to satisfy our third criteria. As the Agreement satisfies all three 
of our criteria, the South West Native Title Settlement is Australia’s first treaty.  
IV Conclusion 
In this article, we have explored the concepts and principles underlying negotiated 
agreements between Indigenous peoples and the State to understand what constitutes 
a treaty. A first principles assessment, and close examination of the modern treaty-
making process in Canada, reveals that a treaty contains three elements. First, 
recognition that Indigenous peoples are polities, and so are distinctive and 
differentiated from other citizens within the State. Second, that settlement is 
achieved via a broad-ranging political agreement negotiated in good faith and in a 
manner respectful of each party’s standing as a polity. Third, that the State 
recognises or establishes, and resources, structures of culturally appropriate 
governance with powers of decision-making and control that amount to (at least) a 
limited form of self-government. Treaties are not merely symbolic instruments; they 
entail transferring some decision-making power from the State to Indigenous 
polities. The extent and scope of that self-governing power will differ according to 
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context, but some decision-making power must be transferred. In consideration, 
Indigenous peoples must accept that the settlement constitutes a resolution of their 
claims against the State. 
Assessing agreements made under and outside the NTA regime against these 
criteria indicates that the Noongar Settlement comprises the first treaty between 
Indigenous peoples and the State in Australia. This is a noteworthy achievement. It 
rectifies an absence long regarded as problematic. In 1832, for example, in the 
aftermath of the ‘Black War’, George Arthur, Governor of Van Diemen’s Land, 
remarked that it was ‘a fatal error … that a treaty was not entered into with the 
natives’ there. He recommended to the Colonial Office that an understanding be 
reached with the Indigenous peoples before a new colony was established in South 
Australia ‘to prevent a long-continued warfare’.282 With the signing of the Noongar 
Treaty, Australia has — at long last — finalised a treaty.  
The Noongar Treaty has two important consequences for future debate. First, 
the Noongar Treaty demonstrates how much of the current debate is misdirected in 
focusing upon the idea of a national treaty. Treaty processes are underway at the 
state and territory level in Victoria, the Northern Territory and South Australia, and 
have led to the first such outcome in Western Australia. As in Canada, we can expect 
negotiations to occur predominately at this level. Significantly, these are moving 
forward despite the rhetoric emerging nationally as part of the constitutional 
recognition process. Second, in registering the comprehensive political agreement 
as six ILUAs, the Agreement evinces that treaties can be achieved in a manner 
consistent with Australia’s existing public law system. Indeed, this can be done in a 
relatively straightforward way, with the key impediments being political will and 
successful compromise between Indigenous peoples and the State. 
If the Noongar Treaty emerges as a popular and fruitful settlement, it can 
provide the basis for further treaties with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples. Such negotiated treaties will mark an important break from a system that 
for many decades has disregarded the views of Indigenous Australians, and 
reinforced their feelings of powerlessness. As Glen Kelly, CEO of the SWLSC and 
Noongar lead negotiator, has explained, the Noongar Treaty ‘will have a massive 
and revitalising effect on Noongar people and culture’.283 
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